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This paper presents a systematic method for classifying research on international channels of distribution. It is used to examine 79 articles published during an 18‐year period (1988‐2005). Based on content analysis, each article is classified by its primary research framework. Two frameworks are identified: (1) structural ‐ based on the economic and organizational aspects of international channels of distribution; and (2) behavioral ‐ based on the exchange relationship between channel members from different national environments. This simple organizing system offers a comprehensive way to analyze scholarship that has emerged in the field. For managers, it can bring the theoretical and practical developments together in an understandable fashion as they seek to interpret and apply research findings. For scholars, it may bring focus to an increasingly complex area of international business and guide future research efforts.

Three types of industrial buyer-seller relational process models are available: joining theory, stage theory, and state theory. However, historically, these models have developed based on the knowledge and cultural context of the Western world. Several researchers note that national culture may have an impact on international industrial buyer-seller relationships. Including culture in the models is highly important, especially as the business environment is increasingly more global and different countries have different business cultures. The goal of this paper is to define the most suitable industrial buyer-seller relational process models for describing relationships in various contexts. The paper includes a through literature review and a single case study in order to reach this objective. A new state theory model evolved during the research. It consists of two beginning states: searching and starting; four purely middles states: constant/static, decline, growth, and troubled; and a purely end state: termination. The state of dormant/inert is both a middle state and an end state, that is, when the relational actors are not in contact does not mean that the relationship has ended, but instead, for example, new legislation may have been implemented, which requires the actors to evaluate their relationship and its future. A relationship goes through the two beginning states in the order mentioned above, but after that, any state may occur.

This paper delves into the mechanism of the contingency framework for foreign entry mode decisions and identifies two essential tasks that jointly determine the outcome of the entry mode decision. It then recognizes a critical weakness in previous research pertaining to the comparison of entry modes along a key decision criterion, the degree of control. Existing studies generally treat equity involvement as the only source of entrant control, while largely ignoring non‐equity sources of control (i.e., bargaining power and trust). Non‐equity sources of control, when underutilized, amount to missed opportunities, increased resource commitments, and heightened risk exposures in foreign markets. Drawing from a pluralism perspective in transaction and relationship governance, the author presents a more integrative method for the ranking of entry modes along the degree of control. The central message is that companies entering foreign markets should make an earnest effort to identify trust and bargaining power situations and fully utilize their control potential in making entry mode decisions.

One of the main functions of culture is division of labour among various actors in society. Since the global environment is characterised by diverse and deep‐rooted cultural norms and value systems, the nature of this division of labour across cultures should exhibit systematic differences. Channels of distribution are primarily designed to facilitate division of labour, and channel relationships should therefore reflect the underlying cultural tenets of society. Using Hofstede′s schemata to classify various national cultures, a series of propositions is generated on how distribution channel relationships will vary across countries based on their positions on Hofstede′s four dimensions of culture.

Although instability characterises export channels, little research has examined the interfirm evaluations that are related to a manufacturer′s continued use of export middlemen. In this research, a manufacturer′s evaluations of its international intermediary are divided into performance, dependence, and importance dimensions. Theoretical and empirical literatures are used to frame hypotheses linking each evaluative dimension to an aspect of the manufacturer′s channel design strategy. The results show that manufacturers′ evaluations of their middlemen are systematically related to the economic and organisational strategies used by manufacturers. The discussion draws important implications for managing the indirect export channel.

This study aims to understand what primary relationship problem mechanisms can exist in the franchise channel and how exchange partners respond to them. This study demonstrates how the franchisor’s relationship problem mechanisms (threat, contract enforcement) affect the franchisee’s negative active responses (venting, threatened withdrawal).

This study tested hypotheses through multiple regression analysis using data from 200 franchisees in Korea-based food franchise systems.

The results indicated that threat increases venting and threatened withdrawal, while contract enforcement only increases venting. Venting increases threatened withdrawal. In addition, the results indicated that the franchisor’s behavior monitoring positively moderates the relationship between relationship problem mechanisms and negative active responses.

This study helps strategically manage responses to relationship problems by categorizing ‘relationship problem mechanisms’ into intentional relationship problem mechanisms based on communication (threat) and unintentional relationship problem mechanisms based on action (contract enforcement). This study finds that both relationship problem mechanisms, intentional or unintentional, eventually cause threatened withdrawal directly or indirectly. Even if the threat is merely communication, not action, it is more likely to cause relationship dissolution than contract enforcement by directly triggering any negative active response. This study also finds that behavior monitoring can affect exchange partners through interaction with other management mechanisms rather than directly affecting them.

Some understanding and form of inter‐organisation management is necessary and desirable if a channel is to maintain or achieve satisfactory performance as a competitive entity (Stern and El‐Ansary 1992). Although this view is not novel (of. Alderson 1954,1957), it has not been the subject of extensive research (Frazier 1983), and interorganisational coordination in distribution channels has perhaps received less focus as a survival requirement (Dwyer and Oh 1988) than it deserves. Stern and El‐Ansary (1992) seem to reflect traditional points of view when stating that power is the major means available to achieve coordination and co‐operation among channel members. Power, however, gives rise to channel dependence and interdependence issues, (of. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Gaski 1984; Brown, Lusch and Muehling 1983), and issues of interorganisational governance mechanisms which for some years have also interested institutional economists, (of. Williamson 1993, 1991, 1986, 1981, 1975, Ouchi 1980) and economic sociologists, (of. Granovetter, 1985, Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). The marketing literature (of. Heide and John 1992; 1990; 1988) has questioned Williamson's somewhat simplistic treatment of opportunism as an underlying behavioural norm, central as this is to his transaction cost paradigm. Since Heide and John's [1992] work on the role of norms in marketing relationships, there is a distinct possibility that insufficient further research has been done in order to allow comparisons of their findings with those of other studies that differ with regard to cultures, settings, and time periods. Maintaining focus on the transaction between dyadic exchange partners as a fundamental activity in marketing channels (of. Achrol, Stern, and Reve 1983), the objectives of this article are to examine the existence or otherwise of relational norms between dyadic exchange partners serving as a governance mechanism safeguarding against opportunistic behaviour in the presence of transaction‐specific assets. The work of Heide and John [1992] shed much light on this, but examined the dyad from the perspective of a strong buyer facing a large number of small suppliers. We will focus on a strong supplier, facing a large number of small buyers, currently, but not indefinitely, bound to it by legislation and contract. The perspective adopted will be that of many small buyers (phar‐macies) from a monopolistic ethical drug wholesaler, at the time of dismantling of a statutory wholesale drug monopoly in Norway.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a guidance for boundary personnel regarding how to use influence strategies to increase channel satisfaction across relationship development process.

This paper investigates the use of influence strategies and their impact on channel satisfaction across formation, operation, and maintenance stage from Das and Teng's viewpoint. The sample from Taiwanese manufacture in electronic, information and motors industry involving buyer‐supplier relationships, and asks respondents (sales manager) to select a newer customer to complete a questionnaire for enable sufficient responses to be obtained, representing different stages of the buyer‐supplier relationship.

The results indicate that the frequency of requests, promises, legalistic pleas, and threat strategies differ significantly among relationship stages. Additionally, information exchange, recommendations, and request strategies have dramatic effect on channel satisfaction across different stages.

This paper proposes the most appropriate model for channel managers to apply influence strategies judiciously in each relationship stage.

While organization theories acknowledge the influence of specific assets on dependence and increasingly represent the latter as a structure of mutual dependence (dependence of A on B and dependence of B on A), there is, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical test concerning the impact of specific assets on a structure of dependence. Our chapter aims to fill this gap. It is all the more original in that it considers a case study where dependence changes sides according to the characteristics of the transaction. We examine the dependence between Chilean exporters and European importers when trading fresh produce. Such dependence originates with the need for just-in-time coordination and compliance with a compelling demand in a context of high price uncertainty.

Using a unique dataset from international trade in fresh produce between Chile and the rest of the world, we justify the use of a concentration sales ratio as a proxy for dependence and test the influence of a variety of specific assets on the side of dependence by using both categorical and dimensional approaches. Original findings show that certain transaction attributes have a strong influence on the side of dependence. In particular, the higher the frequency and the level of specific assets such as volume, niche varieties, and joint sales with other products, in the transaction, the greater the likelihood of a higher ratio of dependence for the importer rather than the exporter. Conversely, in the event of low levels of specific assets and less frequent operations, dependence tends to be greater on the side of the exporter.

In contrast to many studies that were conducted in a Western context, this study seeks to extend the understanding and empirical findings on power, dependence, and interfirm influence strategies by examining these issues within a channel of distribution in Singapore. Research hypotheses are developed, centering on the relationship between a manufacturer’s power and its use of coercive and noncoercive influence strategies as well as the reciprocal use of coercive and noncoercive influence strategies in the channel dyad. Data from a field study of personal computer dealers are used in testing the research hypotheses. In contrast to most previous studies, a multiple‐item measure of influence strategies is used. Among the findings is that a manufacturer in this channel setting tends to use both coercive and noncoercive influence strategies in influencing its dealers.